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Recent studies focusing on basic visual attributes,
such as luminance, colour and motion, are providing
a starting point for investigating the relationship
between perceptual and neural manifestations of
attention.
Although the nature of selective attention remains one
of the knottier conundrums of perception research,
some aspects of this tangle of problems are now
approaching a pleasing state of clarity. It is now quite
evident that directing attention to a visual stimulus
changes neural responses to that stimulus throughout
the visual cortex [1], and that these widespread neural
changes affect, unsurprisingly, many aspects of visual
function. Perhaps most consequential is the influence
that attention wields over the contents of visual aware-
ness and, thus, over all the post-perceptual processing
that awareness entails — short-term memory, percep-
tual decisions, voluntary responses and so forth. In fact,
awareness seems to follow attention so inexorably that
there is a temptation to equate the two, but a closer
look yields a good crop of counterexamples [2].
Another major effect on visual function is that atten-
tion appears to enhance and augment the mental rep-
resentation of visual stimuli in quantitative and qual-
itative ways. This ‘signal enhancement’ manifests itself
in a variety of ways, including accelerated reaction
times, improved sensitivity (thresholds) [3,4], reduced
interactions with flanking stimuli [5,6], and elimination
of illusory conjunctions [7]. Finally, attention allows
visual decisions to be based on the selected stimulus
alone and thus to disregard any distracting stimuli
which may be present. Accordingly, attention is often
said to increase ‘positional certainty’ [8]. Of course,
these manifold manifestations of attention — aware-
ness, signal quality, positional certainty — may well be
closely interrelated and connected. Indeed, visual
selective attention is thought to exhibit many of the
hallmarks of an integrated, all-or-none process.
A new study by Morrone et al. [9], published recently
in Current Biology, focuses on ‘signal quality’ with
respect to luminance and colour contrast. The per-
ception of contrast can be precisely quantified, and
although the neural basis is not yet known with
certainty, there exist plausible candidate pathways for
both luminance and colour contrast in visual cortex
[10–12]. Thus, the most basic of all visual attributes —
contrast — presents an excellent opportunity for
linking perceptual and neural manifestations of atten-
tion. Morrone et al. [9] measured ‘increment thresh-
olds’ for both luminance and colour contrast, that is,
they determined how far each type of contrast must
be raised above a given baseline level for the
difference to be distinguished. They repeated their
measurement of ‘increment thresholds’, in which a
large grating pattern appeared either side of fixation,
three times, for both types of contrast, coaxing the
observer’s attention into a different state each time.
The coaxing was done by a visual search near fixation,
which the observer was obliged to carry out as an
additional, concurrent task (an effective and reliable
way to control allocation of attention [2]).
The special twist applied by Morrone et al. [9] was
that, just as with the contrast task, the visual search
also involved either luminance or colour contrast —
the search targets differed from non-targets in either
luminance or colour contrast. With this twist, the
authors were able to compare three distinct states of
attention: attention divided between tasks involving
the same type of contrast; attention divided between
different types of contrast; and attention focussed on
the grating pattern (whilst the visual search is ignored).
Among the several intriguing contributions of this
study, the sheer size of the observed effects of atten-
tion takes first place. When attention was focussed,
the measured threshold increments of luminance and
colour contrast were approximately 30–70% lower than
when it was divided (between same types of contrast),
implying a correspondingly large improvement in the
signal-to-noise ratio. To put this in perspective, we can
compute how much the contrast gain of a hypothetical
neuronal population would have to increase in order for
the signal-to-noise ratio to improve to this extent.
Morrone et al. [9] calculate this to be an approximately
two-fold increase in contrast gain. This may be an
underestimate, however, as it assumes a response
variance that is independent of the response mean,
whereas the response variance of cortical neurons
grows roughly in proportion to the mean.
The results of Morrone et al. [9] may thus actually
indicate that focused attention confers as much as a
four-fold increase in the contrast gain of neuronal
populations encoding luminance and colour contrast
[13]. Although this figure may seem implausibly large,
it is well in line with earlier studies of attention effects
on contrast thresholds [4]. Matching these large
threshold differences to correspondingly large changes
in neural activity is complicated by the vast difference
in paradigms and by uncertainty about the exact neu-
ronal substrate of luminance and colour perception. In
visual cortical areas V1 and V2, where functional
imaging studies show that BOLD activity correlates
reasonably well with psychophysical sensitivity to
luminance [14] and colour contrast [15], the size of
attention-induced changes in BOLD activity can reach
at least 25–40% of the size of stimulus-evoked
changes [16,17]. However, the neural substrate of per-
ceived contrast must presumably be sought in sub-
populations of early visual cortical areas, such as the
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upper layers of ‘inter-blob’ regions in area V1 and
‘inter-stripe’ regions in area V2 for luminance contrast,
and upper layers of ‘blob’ regions in area V1 and ‘thin-
stripe’ regions in area V2 for colour contrast (where
the blobs, stripes and intervening regions are defined
by cytochemical labeling) [10–12]. Finding the large
response changes predicted by the psychophysical
evidence in such defined populations will most likely
require single-unit recording in behaving primates.
Another intriguing aspect of the findings reported by
Morrone et al. [9] is what they term ‘independent
attention’. The observation in question is that dividing
attention lowers thresholds when the division spans
the same type of contrast — colour search and colour
grating, or luminance search and luminance grating —
but not when it spans different types of contrast —
colour search and luminance grating, or vice versa. To
account for this observation, Morrone et al. [9] propose
the existence of two independent ‘beams’ of attention,
one raising sensitivity for luminance contrast and the
other sensitivity for colour contrast (Figure 1A). 
Assuming that each postulated ‘beam’ can benefit
either one stimulus or the other — search stimulus or
grating stimulus — but not both, this hypothesis
would neatly explain the results. However, as there is
considerable prior evidence that attention is an inte-
grated, all-or-none process [2,18] — a single ‘beam’
raising sensitivity to all types of threshold — it is
prudent to consider whether there may be alternative
interpretations. Indeed, one alternative is that there is
a single ‘beam’ which may benefit either one stimulus
or the other, or both. 
Assuming that physical stimulus differences enforce
(via grouping) a ‘narrow beam’ for the same type of
contrast while permitting a ‘wide beam’ for different
types of contrast (Figure 1B), this could account for
the results just as well. Parenthetically, it should be
noted that both alternatives assume additionally that
some visual awareness of either stimulus is mediated
by non-attentive processes — the global stimulus
competition underlying bottom-up saliency [2,19] —
so that a (reduced) sensitivity can be measured even
in the absence of an ‘attentional beam’.
To decide between these alternatives, one would
need independent information as to whether the
‘attentional beam’ was narrow or wide in the situations
under consideration. Typically, a ‘narrow beam’ can
be assumed when concurrent tasks interfere to the
point of mutual exclusion, that is, when optimal per-
formance of one task reduces performance of the
other task to the level of chance [2,20]. In the present
experiment, this was clearly not the case —observers
happily performed both tasks well above chance — so
that we lack positive proof of a ‘narrow beam’. In fact,
the experiment of Morrone et al. [9] was deliberately
patterned after situations known to yield compara-
tively modest degrees of interference (which never-
theless translate into very substantial changes in
sensitivity) and which thus are relatively uninformative
as to ‘beam’ width.
It is perhaps not too churlish to suggest that atten-
tion research remains caught in a thicket of conceptual
and methodological confusions, at least as far as more
fundamental questions about its computational nature,
its neuroanatomical basis in cortex and subcortex, and
its implementation in local neuronal circuits are con-
cerned. The new study by Morrone et al. [9] points




Two alternative ways of interpreting the findings of Morrone et
al. [9]. Schematic illustration of the four different visual displays
used (LL, CC, LC, CL) and of possible distributions of attention.
A visual search array (colour or luminance search) is at the
centre of each display. In the search task, observers report on
an array element of distinct colour or luminance: is it present or
absent? Two grating patterns (colour or luminance) appear on
either side of the search array. Observers compare the grating
contrast — is it higher left or right? — in order to measure sen-
sitivity for colour/luminance contrast. When observers perform
both the search and grating tasks, contrast sensitivity deterio-
rates in the CC and LL cases, but remains unchanged in the CL
and LC cases. This is indicated by the red Xs or Vs on the right
margin. Why should focussing attention on the search have this
differential effect? (A) Morrone et al. [9] propose two indepen-
dent 'beams' of attention, one raising sensitivity for colour and
one for luminance contrast. If each 'beam' can benefit only one
task at a time — either search or grating task but not both —
then the grating patterns will be unattended in CC and LL, but
not in CL and LC situations, explaining the differential outcome
observed. (B) Another possibility is a single 'beam' of attention,
which may benefit either one task or both. If this 'beam' was
focussed narrowly on the search array in CC and LL, but dis-
persed more widely between search array and grating pattern
in CL and LC, this would also account for the results. Such dif-
ferences in the spatial distribution of attention may result from






















detailed psychophysical characterisation of how atten-
tion changes visual sensitivity and phenomenal expe-
rience, followed (hopefully) by the identification of
corresponding changes in localised neuronal activity.
Basic visual attributes — luminance, colour and
motion, for example — for which plausible candidate
pathways in visual cortex have been proposed, are the
obvious starting points for this route. Although aimed
at attention, such endeavours will also illuminate other
basic aspects of the neurobiology of vision. One may
look forward, in particular, to learning more about the
cortical encoding of visual information and perhaps
even about the neural basis of visual awareness.
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